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Conceptual short term memory (CSTM) is a theoretical construct that provides one answer
to the question of how perceptual and conceptual processes are related. CSTM is a men-
tal buffer and processor in which current perceptual stimuli and their associated concepts
from long term memory (LTM) are represented brieﬂy, allowing meaningful patterns or
structures to be identiﬁed (Potter, 1993, 1999, 2009). CSTM is different from and comple-
mentary to other proposed forms of working memory: it is engaged extremely rapidly, has
a large but ill-deﬁned capacity, is largely unconscious, and is the basis for the unreﬂective
understanding that is characteristic of everyday experience. The key idea behind CSTM is
that most cognitive processing occurs without review or rehearsal of material in standard
workingmemory andwith little or no conscious reasoning.When one perceives ameaning-
ful stimulus such as aword, picture, or object, it is rapidly identiﬁed at a conceptual level and
in turn activates associated information from LTM. New links among concurrently active
concepts are formed in CSTM, shaped by parsing mechanisms of language or grouping
principles in scene perception and by higher-level knowledge and current goals.The result-
ing structure represents the gist of a picture or the meaning of a sentence, and it is this
structure that we are conscious of and that can be maintained in standard working mem-
ory and consolidated into LTM. Momentarily activated information that is not incorporated
into such structures either never becomes conscious or is rapidly forgotten. This whole
cycle – identiﬁcation of perceptual stimuli, memory recruitment, structuring, consolidation
in LTM, and forgetting of non-structured material – may occur in less than 1 s when viewing
a pictured scene or reading a sentence. The evidence for such a process is reviewed and
its implications for the relation of perception and cognition are discussed.
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INTRODUCTION: CONCEPTUAL SHORT TERMMEMORY
Conceptual short term memory (CSTM) is a construct based on
the observation that most cognitive processing occurs without
review or rehearsal of material in standard working memory and
with little or no conscious reasoning. CSTM proposes that when
one perceives a meaningful stimulus such as a word, picture, or
object, it is rapidly identiﬁed and in turn activates associated
information from long term memory (LTM). New links among
concurrently active concepts are formed in CSTM, shaped by
parsing mechanisms of language or grouping principles in scene
perception, and by higher-level knowledge and current goals. The
resulting structure is conscious and represents one’s understand-
ing of the gist of a picture or the meaning of a sentence. This
structured representation is consolidated into LTM if time per-
mits. Momentarily activated information that is not incorporated
into such structures either never becomes conscious or is rapidly
forgotten. Figure 1 shows a cartoon of CSTM in relation to LTM
and one component of conventional STM.
CSTM IN RELATION TO OTHER MEMORY SYSTEMS AND OTHER
MODELS
Conceptual short term memory is a processing and memory sys-
tem that differs from other forms of short term memory. In
vision, iconic memory (Sperling, 1960) maintains a detailed visual
representation for up to about 300ms, but it is eliminated by new
visual stimulation. Meaning plays little or no role. Visual short
term memory (VSTM) holds a limited amount of visual infor-
mation (about four items’ worth) and is somewhat resistant to
interference from new stimulation as long as the information is
attended to (Coltheart, 1983; Phillips, 1983; Luck andVogel, 1997;
Potter and Jiang, 2009). Although VSTM is more abstract than
perception in that the viewer does not mistake it for concurrent
perception, it maintains information about many characteristics
of visual perception, including spatial layout, shape, color, and size.
In audition, the phonological loop (Baddeley, 1986) holds a limited
amount (about 2 s worth) of recently heard or internally gener-
ated auditory information, and this sequence can be maintained
as long as the items are rehearsed (see Figure 1).
Conceptual short term memory differs from these other mem-
ory systems in one ormore ways: in CSTM,new stimuli are rapidly
categorized at a meaningful level, associated material in LTM is
quickly activated, this information is rapidly structured, and infor-
mation that is not structured or otherwise consolidated is quickly
forgotten (or never reaches awareness). In contrast, standardwork-
ingmemory, such asBaddeley’s articulatory/phonological loop and
visuospatial sketchpad together with a central executive (Baddeley,
1986, 2007), focuses on memory systems that support cogni-
tive processes that take place over several seconds or minutes. A
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FIGURE 1 | Conceptual short term memory (CSTM) is represented in
this cartoon as a combination of new perceptual information and
associations from long term memory (LTM) out of which structures are
built. Material that is not included in the resulting structure is quickly
forgotten. The articulatory loop system that provides a limited, rehearsable
phonological short term memory (STM) is separate from CSTM. Adapted
from Figure 1 in Potter (1993).
memory system such as the phonological loop is unsuited for con-
ceptual processing that takes place within a second of the onset of
a stream of stimuli: it takes too long to be set up and it does not
represent semantic and conceptual information directly. Instead,
Baddeley’s working memory directly represents articulatory and
phonological information or visuospatial properties: these rep-
resentations must be reinterpreted conceptually before further
meaning-based processing can occur.
More recently, Baddeley (2000) proposed an additional system,
the episodic buffer, that represents conceptual information and
may be used in language processing. The episodic buffer is “a tem-
porary store of limited capacity. . . capable of combining a range
of different storage dimensions, allowing it to collate information
from perception, from the visuo-spatial and verbal subsystems
and LTM. . . representing them as multidimensional chunks or
episodes. . .” (Baddeley and Hitch, 2010). Baddeley notes that this
idea is similar to CSTM as it was described in 1993 (Potter, 1993).
Although Baddeley’s multi-system model of working memory
has become the dominantmodel of short termmemory, it neglects
the evidence that stimuli in almost any cognitive task rapidly acti-
vate a large amount of potentially pertinent information, followed
by rapid selection and then decay or deactivation of the rest.
That can happen an order of magnitude faster than the setting
up of a standard, rehearsable STM representation, permitting the
seemingly effortless processing of experience that is typical of cog-
nition. Of course, not all cognitive processing is effortless: our
ability to engage in slower, more effortful reasoning, recollection,
and planning may well draw on conventional short term memory
representations.
Relation to other cognitive models
Many models of cognition include some form of processing
that relies on persistent activation or memory buffers other
than standard working memory, tailored to the particular task
being modeled. CSTM may be regarded as a generalized capacity
for rapid abstraction, pattern recognition, and inference that is
embodied in a more speciﬁc form in models such as ACT-R (e.g.,
Budiu and Anderson, 2004), the construction–integration model
of discourse comprehension (Kintsch, 1988), the theory of long
term working memory (Ericsson and Kintsch, 1995); and mod-
els of reading comprehension (e.g., Just and Carpenter, 1992; see
Potter et al., 1980; Verhoeven and Perfetti, 2008).
EVIDENCE FOR CSTM
RAPID SERIAL VISUAL PROCESSING AS A METHOD FOR STUDYING
CSTM
The working of CSTM is most readily revealed when processing
time is limited. A simple way to limit processing time for visual
stimuli is to use a single visual mask, immediately after a brief
presentation.The idea is to replace or interferewith continuedpro-
cessing of the stimulus by presenting a new image that will occupy
the same visual processors. Backward masks, if they share many
of the same features (contours, colors, and the like) as the target
stimulus, do produce interference and may prevent perception or
continued processing of the target. Much has been learned about
how we perceive, using backward masking. However, for complex
stimuli such as pictures or written words, conceptual processing
may continue despite themask; to interfere with understanding or
memory for the target, themask itself must engage conceptual pro-
cessing that will interfere with that of the target. An effective way
to create such a limitation is to present a rapid sequence of visual
stimuli, termed rapid serial visual processing (RSVP) by Forster
(1970). By using RSVP in which all the stimuli (pictures or words)
are meaningful and need to be attended, one can obtain a better
measure of the actual processing time required for an individual
stimulus or for the sequence as a whole (Potter, 1976; Intraub,
1984; Loftus and Ginn, 1984; Loftus et al., 1988). This method was
used in many of the studies cited in the present review.
SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE
The evidence is summarized here before presenting some of it
in more detail. Three interrelated phenomena give evidence for
CSTM:
(1) There is rapid access to conceptual (semantic) information
about a stimulus and its associations. Conceptual information
about a word or a picture is available within 100–300ms, as
shown by experiments using semantic priming (Neely, 1991),
including masked priming (Forster and Davis, 1984) and so-
called fast priming (Sereno and Rayner, 1992); eye tracking
when reading (Rayner, 1983,1992) or looking at pictures (Lof-
tus, 1983); measurement of event-related potentials during
reading (Kutas and Hillyard, 1980; Luck et al., 1996); and tar-
get detection in RSVP with letters and digits (Sperling et al.,
1971; Chun and Potter, 1995), with pictures (Potter, 1976;
Intraub, 1981; Potter et al., 2010), or with words (Lawrence,
1971b; Potter et al., 2002; Davenport and Potter, 2005). To
detect a target such as an animal name in a stream of words,
the target must ﬁrst be identiﬁed (e.g., as the word tiger) and
then matched to the target category, an animal name (e.g.,
Meng and Potter, 2011). Conceptually deﬁned targets can
Frontiers in Psychology | Perception Science April 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 113 | 2
Potter Conceptual short term memory
be detected in a stream of non-targets presented at rates of
8–10 items/s or higher, showing that categorical information
about a written word or picture is activated and then selected
extremely rapidly. These and other experimental procedures
show that semantic or conceptual characteristics of a stim-
ulus have an effect on performance as early as 100ms after
its onset. This time course is too rapid to allow participation
by slower cognitive processes, such as intentional encoding,
deliberation, or serial comparison in working memory.
(2) New structures can be discovered or built out of the activated
conceptual information, inﬂuenced by the observer’s task or
goal.Activated conceptual information canbeused todiscover
or build a structured representation of the information, or (in
a search task) to select certain stimuli at the expense of others.
A major source of evidence for these claims comes from stud-
ies using RSVP sentences, comparedwith scrambled sentences
or lists of unrelated words. Studies by Forster (1970), Potter
(1984, 1993), Potter et al. (1980), and Potter et al. (1986) show
that it is possible to process the structure in a sentence and
hence to recall it subsequently, when reading at a rate such as
12words/s. In contrast,when short lists of unrelatedwords are
presented at that rate, only two or three words can be recalled
(see also Lawrence, 1971a). For sentences, not only the syn-
tactic structure, but also the meaning and plausibility of the
sentence is recovered as the sentence is processed (Potter et al.,
1986). Because almost all sentences one normally encounters
(and all the sentences in these experiments) include new com-
binations of ideas, structure-building is not simply amatter of
locating a previously encountered pattern in LTM: it involves
the instantiation of a new relationship among existing con-
cepts. The same is truewhen viewing a newpictured scene: not
onlymust critical objects and the setting be identiﬁed, but also
the relations among them: the gist of the picture. Structure-
building presumably takes advantage of asmuch old structure
as possible, using any preexisting associations and chunks of
information to bind elements (such as individual words in a
list) together.
(3) There is rapid forgetting of information that is not structured
or that is not selected for further processing.Conceptual infor-
mation is activated rapidly, but the initial activation is highly
unstable and will be deactivated and forgotten within a few
hundred milliseconds if it is not incorporated into a struc-
ture. As a structure is built – for example, as a sentence is
being parsed and interpreted – the resulting interpretation
can be held in memory and ultimately stabilized or consoli-
dated inworking or LTMas a unit,whereas only a small part of
an unstructured sequence such as a string of unrelated words
can be consolidated in the same time period.
UNDERSTANDING PICTURES AND SCENES
In studies in which unrelated photographs are presented in RSVP,
viewers can readily detect a picture when given a brief descriptive
title such as wedding or two men talking, at rates of presentation
up to about 10 pictures/s, even though they have never seen that
picture before and an inﬁnite number of different pictures could
ﬁt the description (Potter, 1976; Intraub, 1981; see Figure 2 and
Potter (2009) Demo 1 for a demonstration). As Figure 2 shows,
FIGURE 2 | Detection of a target picture in an RSVP sequence of 16
pictures, given a name or picture of the target, as a function of the
presentation time per picture. Also shown is later recognition
performance in a group that simply viewed the sequence, and then was
tested for recognition. Results are corrected for guessing. Adapted from
Figure 1 in Potter (1976).
detection is almost as accurate when given only a name, as when
shown the target picture itself.
More recent research shows that viewers can detect named pic-
tures in RSVP sequences at above-chance levels at still higher rates,
even for durations as short as 13ms (Potter,Wyble, and McCourt,
in preparation). Evidently viewers can extract the conceptual gist
of a picture rapidly, retrieving relevant conceptual information
about objects and their background from LTM. Having spotted
the target picture, viewers can continue to attend to it and con-
solidate it into working memory – for example, after the sequence
they can describe the picnic scene they were looking for, or recog-
nize it in a forced choice task. Yet, when they are not looking for
a particular target, viewers forget most pictures presented at that
rate almost immediately, as shown in Figure 2 (Potter and Levy,
1969; see also Intraub, 1980). The rate must be slowed to about
2 pictures/s for viewers to recognize as many as half the pictures as
familiar when tested minutes after the sequence.
If a test picture is presented immediately after the sequence,
however, viewers are usually able to recognize it, even if the pictures
have been presented at a rate such as 6/s (Potter et al., 2004). That
is, for a second they will remember most of the presented pictures,
but memory drops off rapidly over the ﬁrst few seconds thereafter,
as memory is tested (Figure 3). Picture memory includes under-
standing of the gist of a picture, not just speciﬁc visual features,
as shown by the ability of viewers to call a picture to mind when
given a descriptive title as a recognition cue. Just as a viewer can
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FIGURE 3 | Probability (corrected for chance) of recognizing a picture
as a function of relative serial position in the test, separately for a
group given pictures in the recognition test and one given titles.
Pictures were presented at 6/s and tested with a yes–no test of pictures or
just of titles. Adapted from Figure 4 in Potter et al. (2004).
detect a picture that matches a target description given in advance,
such as “baby reaching for a butterﬂy,” so can viewers recognize
that they saw a picture that matches a name if they are given the
name shortly after viewing the sequence. Recognition memory is
not quite as good when tested by a title instead of showing the pic-
ture itself, however, and in both cases performance falls off rapidly
(Figure 3). Thus, gist can be extracted rapidly, but is quickly for-
gotten if the presentation was brief and was followed by other
stimuli.
Further evidence for the extraction of gist when viewing a rapid
sequence of pictures is that viewers are more likely to falsely rec-
ognize a new picture with the same gist than a new picture with
an unrelated gist. For example, if they saw a picture of a camel,
they are more likely to falsely say yes to a very different picture of
a camel than to a totally new picture (Figure 4), indicating that at
some level they knew they had seen a camel (Potter et al., 2004).
Other studies with single pictures presented brieﬂy andmasked by
a following stimulus have shown that objects in the foreground are
more easily recognized if they are consistent with the background
(and the background is more readily recognized if it is consistent
with the foreground), showing that relationships within a single
picture are computed during initial recognition (Davenport and
Potter, 2004; Davenport, 2007).
Conclusions: Pictures
Consistent with the CSTM hypothesis, the evidence shows that
meaningful pictures can be understood extremely rapidly, permit-
ting the detection of targets speciﬁed by name (i.e., by meaning)
FIGURE 4 |When participants has viewed the picture on the left and
judged whether they had seen the picture on the right, they made
more false yeses than when the new picture was unrelated in meaning
to any pictures they had viewed. Adapted from Figure 7 in Potter et al.
(2004).
and at least momentary understanding of the gist of a picture,
although there is rapid forgetting if the picture is not selected for
further processing.
UNDERSTANDING RSVP SENTENCES
Our ability to read rapidly and continuously, with comprehension
and substantial memory for themeaning of what we have read, is a
strong indication that we are able to retrieve rapidly a lot of infor-
mation not only about wordmeanings but also general knowledge
about the world and speciﬁc episodicmemories. Good readers can
read about 300words/min, or 5words/s. Eye tracking studies have
shown that the length of time that the eyes rest on a given word
varies with the frequency of that word, its predictability at that
point in the text, and other factors that indicate that the word’s
meaning and its ﬁt to the context is retrieved fast enough to affect
whether the eyes linger on that word or move on (for a review, see
Staub and Rayner, 2007).
Instead of measuring eye movements when reading, one can
use RSVP to control the time available for processing each word
in a sentence. The ﬁrst to try this was Forster, who presented
short sentences at 16words/s, three times faster than a typical
good reader would read spontaneously. He varied the syntactic
complexity of the sentences and showed that recall was less accu-
rate for more complex sentences, implying that sentence syntax
was processed as sentences were read (Forster, 1970; Holmes and
Forster, 1972).
As shown in studies reviewed above, searching for a speciﬁc
target in an RSVP sequence can be easy even at high rates of
presentation, whereas simply remembering all the items in the
presentation can be difﬁcult, if they are unrelated. A claim which
is central to the CSTM hypothesis, however, is that associative
and other structural relations among items can be computed
rapidly, assisting in their retention. This section reviews some of
the evidence for this claim.
Differences between lists and sentences
A person’s memory span is deﬁned as the number of items, such as
unrelated words or random digits, that one can repeat back accu-
rately, after hearing or seeing them presented at a rate of about 1/s.
For unrelatedwords a typicalmemory span is ﬁve or sixwords. The
memory span drops, however, as the rate of presentation increases.
In one experiment (Potter, 1982) lists of 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6 nouns were
presented at rates between 1 and 12word/s, for immediate recall.
The results are shown in Figure 5.
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FIGURE 5 | Immediate recall of RSVP lists of 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6 nouns
presented at rates between 1 and 12words/s. Adapted from Figure 2 in
Potter (1993).
With ﬁve words, recall accuracy declined from a mean of 4.5 at
the 1 s rate to 2.6 words at the rate of 12words/s This was evidently
not because participants could not recognize each of the words at
that rate, because a list of just two words (followed by a mask) was
recalled almost perfectly at 12/s: instead, some additional process
is necessary to stabilize the words in short term memory. Note
that this ﬁnding is similar to that for memory of rapidly presented
pictures, in that one can detect a picture at a rate that is much
higher than the rate required for later memory. In another study
I found that the presentation of two related words on a ﬁve-word
RSVP list (separated by another word) resulted in improved recall
for both words, suggesting that the words were both activated to
a level at which an association could be retrieved. This hinted at
the sort of process that might stabilize or structure information in
CSTM.
In contrast to lists, 14-word sentences presented at rates up
to at least 12words/s can be recalled quite accurately (see Potter,
1984; Potter et al., 1986). The ﬁndings with sentences versus lists or
scrambled sentences strongly support the CSTM assumption that
each word can be identiﬁed and understood with an 83- to 100-
ms exposure, even when it is part of a continuing series of words.
(See Potter, 2009, Demo 2, for a demonstration.) The results also
support the second assumption that representations of the words
remain activated long enough to allow them to be bound into
whatever syntactic and conceptual structures are being built on
the ﬂy. When, as with a list of unrelated words, there is no ready
structure to hand, all but two or three of the words are lost.
How are RSVP sentences recalled? The regeneration hypothesis
Before addressing the question of how rapidly presented sen-
tences are retained, one should address the prior question of why
sentences heard or read at normal rates are easy to repeat imme-
diately, even when they are two or three times as long as one’s
memory span (the length of list that can be repeated accurately).
The difference in capacity between lists and sentences is thought
to be due to some form of chunking, although it has also been
assumed that sentences can be stored in some verbatim form tem-
porarily (see the review by Von Eckardt and Potter, 1985). Before
continuing, try reading the sentence below once, cover it, and then
read the ﬁve words on the next line, look away, and write down
the sentence from memory. (We will come back to this exercise
shortly.)
The knight rode around the palace looking for a place to enter.
Anchor forest castle oven stocking [look away and write down
the sentence].
Instead of assuming that people remember sentences well
because they hold them in some verbatim form, we (Potter
and Lombardi, 1990) proposed a different hypothesis: imme-
diate recall of a sentence (like longer-term recall) is based on
a conceptual or propositional representation of the sentence.
The recaller regenerates the sentence using normal speech-
production processes to express the propositional structure (what
the sentence means). That is, having understood the conceptual
proposition in a sentence, one can simply express that idea in
words, as one might express a new thought. We proposed that
recently activated words were likely to be selected to express
the structure. In consequence, the sentence is normally recalled
verbatim.
To test this hypothesis we (Potter and Lombardi, 1990) pre-
sented distractor words (like the ﬁve words below the sentence
you read above) in a secondary task immediately before or after
the to-be-recalled sentence, andon some trials one of these distrac-
tor words was a good substitute for a word in the sentence (such
as “castle” for “palace”). As we predicted, that word was frequently
intruded in recall, as long as the sentence meaning as a whole was
consistent with the substitution. (Did you substitute “castle” for
“palace”?) In the experiments, half the participants had lure words
like “castle” on the word list, and half did not, allowing us to show
that people are more likely to make the substitution when that
word has appeared recently. Thus, recall is guided by a conceptual
representation, not by a special verbatim representation such as a
phonological representation.
Further studies (Lombardi and Potter, 1992; Potter and
Lombardi, 1998) indicated that syntactic priming from having
processed the sentence plays a role in the syntactic accuracy of
sentence recall. Syntactic priming (e.g., Bock, 1986) is a tempo-
rary facilitation in the production of a recently processed syntactic
structure, as distinguished from direct memory for the syntactic
structure of the prime sentence.
The Potter–Lombardi hypothesis that sentences are compre-
hended and then regenerated rather than “recalled verbatim” is
consistent with the CSTM claim that propositional structures are
built rapidly, as a sentence is read or heard. In one of the Potter
and Lombardi (1990) experiments the sentences were presented
at a rate of 10words/s, rather than the moderate 5words/s of our
other experiments: the intrusion results were essentially the same,
showing that the relevant conceptual processing had occurred at
the higher rate, also.
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Reading RSVP paragraphs: More evidence for immediate use of
structure
A single RSVP sentence is apparently easy to comprehend and
recall when presented as fast as 12words/s, so that recall of a
single sentence at that rate is close to ceiling. Does that mean
that longer-term retention of the sentence will be as good as if
it had been presented more slowly? To answer that question Pot-
ter et al. (1980) presented RSVP paragraphs of about 100 words
at three rates, 4, 8, and 12words/s, with the equivalent of a two-
word pause between sentences (the net rate averaged 3.3, 6.7, or
10words/s). (See Demo 3 in Potter, 2009, for a demonstration.)
Participants wrote down the paragraph as accurately as possi-
ble, immediately after presentation. To evaluate both single-word
perception and use of discourse-level information, paragraphs
were used that appeared to be ambiguous and poorly integrated
unless the reader knew the topic (see Dooling and Lachman, 1971;
Bransford and Johnson, 1972). Only one sentence mentioned the
one-word topic (e.g.,“laundry”), and this sentence appeared either
at the beginning, the middle, or the end of the paragraph, or was
omitted.
Consistent with the prediction that knowing the topic would
enhance recall of the other sentences (and that the topic word
itself would be recalled because of its relevance to the paragraph),
recall was improved for the part of the paragraph after the topic
was presented (but not the part before), at all three rates of pre-
sentation. Even at the highest rate the discourse topic could be
used to structure the paragraph (Figure 6). This suggests that
the discourse topic, once it became evident, remained active as a
source of structure as the rest of the paragraph was read. (The
topic word was perceived and recalled by more than 80% of the
subjects regardless of rate or condition.) At the same time, there
was a marked main effect of rate: recall declined as rate of pre-
sentation increased, from 37% of the idea units at 4 words/s to
26% at 8words/s to 20% at 12words/s, averaging over all topic
conditions. Clearly, even though there was internal evidence that
discourse-level structuring was occurring at all rates of presenta-
tion, some process of consolidation was beginning to fail as rate
increased.
FIGURE 6 | Percentage of idea units recalled in each half of an RSVP
paragraph, as a function of the position of the topic sentence in the
paragraph. Adapted from Figure 20.2 in Potter et al. (1980).
Conclusions: words, sentences, and paragraphs.
Putting the paragraph results together with those for word lists
and single sentences, we see that structuring can occur rapidly,
and that more structure results in better memory (comparing lists
to sentences, or comparing a string of seemingly unrelated sen-
tences to sentences structured by having a topic). Nonetheless,
rapid conceptual processing is not sufﬁcient for accurate retention
if there is no additional time for consolidation: the gist may sur-
vive, but details will be lost in immediate recall, just as they are in
longer-term memory.
MECHANISMS OF STRUCTURING IN RSVP SENTENCE PROCESSING
Although I have repeatedly invoked the idea that there is rapid
structuring of information that is represented in CSTM, I have
had little to say about just how this structuring occurs. In the case
of sentences, it is evident that parsing and conceptual interpreta-
tion must occur virtually word by word, because any substantial
delay would outrun the persistence of unstructured material in
CSTM. Here I will describe brieﬂy three studies that have inves-
tigated the process of selecting an appropriate interpretation of a
given word in an RSVP sentence, a key process in comprehension
given the extent of lexical ambiguity in English and in most other
languages.
The inﬂuence of sentence context on word and non-word
perception
One study (Potter et al., 1993) took advantage of the propen-
sity of readers to misperceive a brieﬂy presented non-word as
an orthographically similar word. Non-words such as dack that
are one letter away from two other words (deck, duck) were pre-
sented in RSVP sentences biased-toward one or the other of these
words or neutral between them, as in the following examples.
Note that when we presented a real word in the biased sentences,
it was always the mismatching word. The sentence was presented
at 10words/s. Participants recalled the sentence; they were told to
report misspelled words or non-words if they saw them.
Neutral:“The visitors noticed the deck/duck/dack by the house”
Biased: “The child fed the deck/dack at the pond”
“The sailor washed the duck/dack of that vessel.”
Our main interest is what participants reported when shown a
non-word. Non-words were reported as the biased-toward word
(here, duck) on 40% of the trials, compared with only 12% with
the neutral sentence and 3% with the biased-against sentence
(the non-words were reported correctly as non-words on 23%
of the neutral trials). Similar although smaller effects of context
were shown when the biased-against word (rather than a non-
word) appeared in the sentence. Thus, context can bias word and
non-word perception even when reading at 10words/s. More sur-
prisingly, even selective context that did not appear until as much
as three words (300ms) after the critical word or non-word inﬂu-
enced perceptual report, suggesting that multiple word candidates
(and theirmeanings) are activated as the non-word or word is per-
ceived, and may remain available for selection for at least 300ms
after the word or non-word has beenmasked by succeeding words.
This supposition that multiple possible words and their mean-
ings are brieﬂy activated during word perception accords with the
Swinney (1979) hypothesis that multiple meanings of ambiguous
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words are brieﬂy activated: both results are consistent with the
CSTM view. In the present study and in the case of ambiguous
words the process of activation and selection appears to occur
unconsciously for the most part, an issue considered in a later
section.
Double-word selection
In another study (Potter et al., 1998) two orthographically distinct
words were presented simultaneously (one above and one below
a row of asterisks) in the course of an RSVP sentence, as illus-
trated below. Participants were instructed to select the one that ﬁt
into the sentence and include it when immediately recalling the
sentence. We regarded this as an overt analog of lexical ambiguity
resolution. The sentence was presented for 133ms/word and the
two-word (“double word”) display for 83ms.
Maggie carried the kitten in a
pencil
******
basket
to her house
Sentence context had a massive inﬂuence on selection: the
appropriate word was included in recall in 70% of the sentences
and the non-matching word in only 13%. This ability to pick the
right word was evident both when the relevant context arrived
before the double words and when it arrived later (up to 1 s later,
in one experiment), showing that readers could activate andmain-
tain two distinct lexical possibilities. Subjects were asked to report
the “other” word (the mismatching word) after they recalled the
sentence, but most of the time they were unable to do so, showing
that the unselected word was usually forgotten rapidly. Again, this
illustrates the existence of fast and powerful processors that can
build syntactically and pragmatically appropriate structures from
brieﬂy activatedmaterial, leaving unselectedmaterial to be rapidly
forgotten.
Lexical disambiguation
Miyake et al. (1994) carried out two experiments on self-paced
reading of sentences with ambiguous words that were not disam-
biguated until two to seven words after the ambiguous word. They
found that readerswith lowormiddling reading spanswere slowed
downwhen the disambiguationwas toward the subordinatemean-
ing, especially with a delay of seven words. (High-span readers
had no problems in any of the conditions.) In an unpublished
experiment we presented subjects with a similar set of sentences
that included an ambiguous word, using RSVP at 10words/s; the
task was to decide whether or not the sentence was plausible,
after which we gave a recognition test of a subset of the words,
including the ambiguousword. The sentence was implausible with
one of the meanings, plausible with the other. Our hypothesis
was that sentences that eventually turned out to require the sub-
ordinate meaning of an ambiguous word would sometimes be
judged to be implausible, implying that only the dominant read-
ing had been retrieved. Unambiguously implausible and plausible
sentences were intermixed with the ambiguous sentences.
Subjects were more likely to judge a plausible sentence to have
been implausible (1) when a subordinate meaning of the ambigu-
ous word was required (27 versus 11% errors), (2) when the
disambiguating information appeared after a greater delay (23
versus 16% errors), and especially (3) when there was both a
subordinate meaning and late disambiguation (32% errors, ver-
sus 9% for the dominant/early condition). A mistaken judgment
that the sentence was implausible suggests that on those trials only
one meaning, the wrong one, was still available at the point of dis-
ambiguation. Interestingly, the ambiguous word itself was almost
always correctly recognized on a recognition test of a subset of
words from the sentence, even when the sentence had mistakenly
been judged implausible. The results suggest that although multi-
plemeanings of a word are indeed brieﬂy activated (in CSTM), the
less frequent meaning will sometimes fall below threshold within
a second, when sentences are presented rapidly.
Conclusion: lexical interpretation and disambiguation
The results of all three studies show that context is used immedi-
ately to bias the perception or interpretation of a word, consistent
with theCSTMclaim that processing to the level ofmeaningoccurs
very rapidly in reading.
SELECTIVE SEARCH AND THE ATTENTIONAL BLINK
The attentional blink
In brief, the attentional blink (AB) is a phenomenon that occurs
in RSVP search tasks in which two targets are presented among
distractors.When the rate of presentation is high but still compat-
ible with accurate report of a single target (e.g., a presentation rate
of 10/s, when the task is to detect letters among digit distractors),
two targets are also likely to be reported accurately except when the
second target appears within 200–500ms of the onset of the ﬁrst
target. This interval during which second target detection drops
dramatically was termed an AB by Raymond et al. (1992).
The AB is relevant to CSTM because it provides evidence for
rapid access to categorical information about rapidly presented
items and at the same time shows that selective processing of spec-
iﬁed targets has a cost. When the task is to pick out targets from
among distractors, the experimental ﬁndings suggest that there is
a difference in time course between two stages of processing, a
ﬁrst stage that results in identiﬁcation of a stimulus (CSTM) and
a second stage required to select and consolidate that information
in a reportable form (Chun and Potter, 1995).
Consider a task in which targets are any letter of the alphabet,
presented in an RSVP sequence of digit distractors. Presumably a
target letter must be identiﬁed as a speciﬁc letter in order to be
classiﬁed as a target (see Sperling et al., 1971). At rates as high
as 11 items/s the ﬁrst letter target (T1) is detected quite accu-
rately, consistent with evidence that a letter can be identiﬁed in less
than 100ms. This initial identiﬁcation is termed Stage 1 process-
ing, which constitutes activation of a conceptual but short-lasting
representation, i.e., a CSTM representation.
But a second target letter (T2) that arrives soon after the ﬁrst
one is likely to be missed, suggesting that a selected target (T1)
requires additional processing beyond identiﬁcation: Stage 2 pro-
cessing. Stage 2 processing is necessary to consolidate a selected
item into some form of short term memory that is more stable
than CSTM. However, Stage 2 processing is serial and limited in
capacity. The items following the ﬁrst target (T1) continue to be
processed successfully in Stage 1 and remain for a short time in
CSTM; the problem is that as long as Stage 2 is tied up with T1,
www.frontiersin.org April 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 113 | 7
Potter Conceptual short term memory
a second target may be identiﬁed but must wait, and thus may be
lost from CSTM before Stage 2 is available. When this happens,
T2 is missed, producing an AB. Although the duration of the AB
varies, it is strong at 200–300ms after the onset of the ﬁrst target,
diminishes thereafter, and is usually gone by 500ms.
Consistent with the CSTM hypothesis, there is both behavioral
and ERP evidence that stimuli that are not reported because of
an AB are nonetheless momentarily comprehended, because they
activate an ERPmismatchmarker when they are inconsistent with
prior context (Luck et al., 1996). Similarly, word targets that are
related in meaning are more accurately detected even when the
second word occurs within the time period that produces an AB
(e.g., Chun et al., 1994; Maki et al., 1997; Vogel et al., 1998; Potter
et al., 2005).
Attention only blinks for selection, not perception or memory
As shown in earlier sections, meaningful items in a continuous
stream, such as the words of a sentence, are easy to see and remem-
ber, which makes the difﬁculty of reporting a second target (the
AB) surprising. When there is an uninterrupted sequence of tar-
gets, as happens when a sentence is presented and recalled as a
whole, there is no AB, whereas if the task is to report just the two
words in a sentence that are marked by color or by case, as in the
following example, there is an AB (Potter et al., 2008).
Our tabby cat CHASED a MOUSE all around the backyard
In a more recent study (Potter et al., 2011), participants did
both tasks simultaneously: they reported the sentence and then
marked the red (or uppercase) words. In another block they only
reported the two target words. AnAB formarking or reporting the
second target word was observed in both blocks. Surprisingly, the
target words were highly likely to be reported as part of the sen-
tence even when the participant could not mark them correctly.
What seemed to happen was that the feature (color or case) that
deﬁned the target was detected, but in the AB interval that fea-
ture was displaced to a different word: the AB interfered with the
binding of the target feature to the correct word.
In subsequent experiments the targets (Arabic digits or digit
words) were inserted between words of the sentence as additional
items, and again participants either reported the digits and then
the surrounding sentence,or just reported the digits. The following
is an example:
Our 6666 tabby cat 2222 chased a mouse all around the
backyard
When participants reported just the digits, they were overall
more accurate, but showed an AB for the second digit string or
number word. When they reported the digits and then the whole
sentence, they did not show anAB for the digits. Evidently the con-
tinuous attention associatedwith processing the sentence included
the inserted digits, allowing them to be selected afterward rather
than during initial processing. We concluded that on-line, imme-
diate selection generates an AB, whereas continuous processing
with delayed selection does not (cf. Wyble et al., 2011).
Summary: CSTM and the attentional blink
Studies of the visual AB demonstrate a dissociation between an
early stage of processing sufﬁcient to identify letters or words
presented at a rate of about 10/s, and a subsequent stage of variable
duration (up to about 400ms) required to stabilize a selected item
in reportable STM. The AB thus provides evidence for the central
claims of CSTM.
FURTHER QUESTIONS ABOUT CSTM
HOW DOES STRUCTURING OCCUR IN CSTM?
Structuring in CSTM is not different in principle from individ-
ual steps in the slower processes of comprehension that happen
as one gradually understands a difﬁcult text or an initially con-
fusing picture, or solves a chess problem over a period of seconds
andminutes. But CSTM structuring occurs with a relative absence
of awareness that alternatives have been weighed and that several
possibilities have been considered and rejected, at least implicitly.
As in slower and more conscious pattern recognition and prob-
lem solving, a viewer’s task set or goal makes a major difference
in what happens in CSTM, because one’s intentions activate pro-
cessing routines such as sentence parsing, target speciﬁcations in
search tasks, and the like. Thus the goal partially determines what
enters CSTM and how structuring takes place.
Conceptual short term memory is built on experience and
learned skills. Seemingly immediate understanding is more likely
for material that is familiar, as becomes evident when one learns
a new language or a new skill such as chess. Our ability to under-
stand a new pictured scene in a fraction of a second also depends
on our lifetime of visual experience.
Compound cuing and latent semantic analysis
The presence of many activated items at any moment, in CSTM,
allows for compound cuing – the convergence of two ormoreweak
associations on an item. The visual system is built on converging
information, with learning playing a major role, at least at higher
levels in the visual system (e.g., DiCarlo et al., 2012), enabling
familiar combinations of features to converge on an interpretation
in a single forward pass. The power of converging cues, familiar
to any crossword puzzle fan, is likely to be central to structure-
building in CSTM. A radical proposal for the acquisition and
representation of knowledge, latent semantic analysis (LSA; Lan-
dauer and Dumais, 1997), provides a suggestive model for how
structure may be extracted from loosely related material. How-
ever, there is no syntactic parser in LSA and it is clear from RSVP
research that we do parse rapidly presented sentences as we read;
thus, the LSA approach is at best a partial model of processing
in CSTM.
IS CSTM CONSCIOUS?
The question is difﬁcult to answer, because we have no clear
independent criterion for consciousness other than availability
for report. And, by hypothesis, report requires some form of
consolidation; therefore, only what persists in a structured form
will be reportable. Thus, while the evidence we have reviewed
demonstrates that there is conceptual processing of material that
is subsequently forgotten, it does not tell uswhetherwewere brieﬂy
conscious of that material, or whether the activation and selection
occurred unconsciously.
It seems unlikely that multiple competing concepts (such as
the multiple meanings of a word) that become active simulta-
neously could all be conscious in the ordinary sense, although
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preliminary structures or interpretations that are quickly dis-
carded might be conscious. For example, people do sometimes
become aware of having momentarily considered an interpreta-
tion of a spoken word that turns out to be mistaken. As noted
earlier, most words are ambiguous, yet we are only rarely con-
scious of multiple meanings (except when someonemakes a pun).
In viewing rapid pictures, people have a sense of recognizing all
the pictures but forgetting most of them. But such experiences in
whichwe are aware of momentary thoughts that were immediately
lost seem to be the exception, rather than the rule. Thus, much of
CSTM activation, selection, and structuring happens before one
becomes aware. It is the structured result, typically, of which one
is aware, which is why perception and cognition seem so effortless
and accurate.
THE LIMITS OF CSTM
Conceptual short term memory is required to explain the human
ability to understand and act rapidly, accurately, and seemingly
effortlessly in response to the presentation of richly structured
sensory input, drawing on appropriate knowledge from LTM.
Working memory as it is generally understood (e.g., Baddeley and
Hitch, 2010) comes into play when a ﬁrst pass in CSTM does
not meet one’s goal. Then, more conscious thought is required,
drawing onworkingmemory together with continued CSTMpro-
cessing. Systematic reasoning, problem solving, recollection, and
planning are slower and more effortful, however. They typically
involve a series of steps, each of which sets up the context for the
next step. CSTM may be involved in each step.
SUMMARY: RAPID CONCEPTUAL PROCESSING FOLLOWED
BY RAPID FORGETTING
In each of the experimental domains discussed – comprehension
and retention of RSVPword lists, sentences, and paragraphs; stud-
ies of word perception and selection; experiments on picture per-
ception andmemory; and the AB – there is evidence for activation
of conceptual information about a stimulus early in processing
(possibly before conscious awareness), followed by rapid forget-
ting unless conditions are favorable for retention. The two kinds
of favorable conditions examined in these studies were selection
for attention (e.g., the ﬁrst target in the AB procedure, or selection
of a target picture from among rapidly presented pictures) and
the availability of associations or meaningful relations between
momentarily active items (as in sentence and paragraph compre-
hension and in perception of the gist of a picture). The power of
these two factors – selective attention that is deﬁned by conceptual
properties of the target, and the presence of potential conceptual
structure – is felt early in processing, before conventional STM
or working memory for the stimuli has been established, justify-
ing the claim that CSTM is separate from those forms of working
memory.
Outside of the laboratory, we usually have control over the rate
of presentation: we normally read at a rate sufﬁcient not only for
momentary comprehension, but also for memory of at least the
gist of what we are reading. Although we cannot control the rate
of input from radio, TV, movies, or computer games, producers
are adept at adjusting the rate to ﬁt the conceptual and mem-
ory requirements of their audience. Similarly, in a conversation
the speaker adjusts his or her rate of speech to accommodate
the listener’s signals of comprehension. Rapid structuring can
only occur if the material permits it and if the skills for dis-
covering latent structure are highly practiced: object and word
recognition, lexical retrieval, sentence parsing, causal inference,
search for a target, and the like. These cognitive skills, built up
over a lifetime, make comprehension seem trivially easy most of
the time.
Conceptual short term memory is the working memory that
supports these processes, lasting just long enough to allow mul-
tiple interpretation to be considered before one is selected and
the remaining elements evaporate, in most cases without entering
awareness. The labored thoughts and decisions we are aware of
pondering are a tiny fraction of those we make effortlessly. Even
these worked-over thoughts may advance by recycling the data
through CSTM until the next step comes to mind. We may be
aware of slowly shaping an idea or solving a problem, but not of
precisely how each step occurs. More work will be needed to gain
a full understanding of this largely preconscious stage of cognitive
processing.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE RELATION BETWEEN PERCEPTION
AND COGNITION
In the present account, perception is continuous with cognition.
Information passes from the sense organs to the brain, undergoing
transformations at every stage, combining with information from
other senses, evoking memories, leading to conscious experience
and actions shaped by one’s goals. These events are continually
renewed or replaced by new experiences, thoughts, and actions.
From the moment the pattern of a falling cup appears on the
retina (to take one example) to the moment when one reaches to
catch it, a series of events has passed through the visual system
and to the motor system by way of the conceptual and goal-
directed systems, at every stage inﬂuenced by prior experience
already represented in these systems. It is to some extent a mat-
ter of convention that we break up such an event into perceptual,
cognitive, goal-directed, and motor parts, when in reality these
parts are not only continuous but also interact. In this example,
perception of the tipping cup combines with conceptual knowl-
edge to elicit the goal and action almost simultaneously, and the
action anticipates the subsequent perceptual sequence. There is no
clear separation between mental/brain activity originating from
outside the observer (“perception”) and that from the observer’s
internally generated thoughts and memories (“cognition”); any
experience is likely to be a blend of these sources. Thinking with
the eyes closed in a dark, silent room might seem to come close to
a “pure” cognitive experience, but our propensity to augment our
thoughts with visual, auditory, and other sense images suggests
that the perceptual system is ubiquitous in cognition. Whether
such self-generated perceptual images are the heart of cognition
(as embodiment theories suggest) or only play a supporting role,
is in dispute, however. I keep Helen Keller in mind as an apparent
counterexample to the claim that cognition is entirely embod-
ied in perception and action: Keller could neither see nor hear,
but those who knew her as an adult had no doubt about her
cognitive abilities and her command not only of language but
also of world knowledge. Was Keller a kinesthetic/proprioceptive
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zombie who simply simulated human understanding, or did
she have an intact capacity for cognitive abstraction, once an
access route for language was established? The latter seems more
likely.
Authorization for the use of experimental animals or human
subjects: The experimental studies described here were approved
by the Internal Review Board of Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, and all participants signed consent forms.
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